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The Hermeneutic Circle of European Insolvency Law 
 
 
Prof. mr. Bob Wessels 
 
 
1 Introduction  
 
In their recent book the Spanish professors Virgós and Garcimartín refer to the 
EC Insolvency Regulation as constituting the general rule, where the Directives 
with regard to reorganization and winding-up of financial institutions form 
special rules, but ‘(…) they all form the ‘hermeneutic circle’ within which 
interpretations should be made. The idea that all these rules must be seen as 
parts of a consistent (although unfinished) statutory scheme is important’.1  
In this article I will shortly describe the Insolvency Regulation and the 
Directives mentioned. I will then highlight some differences between both, 
mainly using illustrations with regard to Directive 2001/24 (banks). I will then 
discuss the treatment of certain (international) financial contracts, such as 
netting contracts and repurchase agreements. At the conclusion the quoted 
characterization as ‘hermeneutic circle’ will be briefly discussed. 
 
 
2 European Insolvency Law as a scheme 
 
The first decade of the millennium has started with a tremendous growth of 
European insolvency law. In 2000 birth was given to the aforementioned 
Regulation (EC) nr. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings 
which entered into force 31 May 2002. Then, for several financial institutions 
falling outside the Regulation’s scope, 2001 is a good year. Directive 2001/17 of 
19 March 2001 on the reorganization and winding-up of insurance undertaking 
and Directive 2001/24 of 4 April 2001 on the reorganization and winding-up of 
credit institutions have seen light. Where a Regulation is a European Communi-
ty law measure binding fully the EU Member States (except for Denmark), a 
Directive has to go through a legislative implementation process in each 
individual EC Member State. The implementation date for Directive 2001/24 is 
20 April 2003 and for Directive 2001/24 it is 5 May 2004. Some countries are 
still drafting, though.2  
                                                 
1 Virgós/Garcimartín, The EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings: Law and Practice, Kluwer Law 
International, 2004, 9ff. 
2 For commentaries on both Directives and for Member State implementation reviews, see Moss/ 
Wessels (eds.), EU Banking and Insurance Insolvency. An Annotated Guide and Comments on the 
Implementation of EC Directives 17/2001 and 24/2001 in EU Member States, Oxford University 
Press 2006. A large majority of countries have enacted the Directives, with in the rear Belgium 





The Insolvency Regulation in a way reflects the fact that as a result of widely 
differing substantive laws ‘(…) it is not practical to introduce insolvency 
proceedings with universal scope in the entire Community’ (recital 13). The 
differences mainly lie in the widely differing laws on security interests to be 
found in the Community and the very different preferential rights enjoyed by 
some creditors in the insolvency proceedings. The goals of the Regulation, with 
47 Articles, are to enable cross-border insolvency proceedings to operate 
efficiently and effectively, to provide for co-ordination of the measures to be 
taken with regard to the debtor’s assets and to avoid forum shopping. The 
Insolvency Regulation, therefore, provides rules for the international jurisdiction 
of courts in a Member State for the opening of insolvency proceedings, the 
(automatic) recognition of these proceedings in other Member States and the 
powers of the ‘liquidator’ in the other Member States. The Regulation also deals 
with important choice of law (or: private international law) provisions. These 
contain special rules on applicable law in the case of particularly significant 
rights and legal relationships (e.g. rights in rem, retention of title, certain 
contracts relating to immoveable property and contracts of employment). On the 
other hand, national proceedings (secondary proceedings) covering only assets 
situated in the State of opening are also allowed alongside main insolvency 
proceedings with universal scope. The Regulation applies entirely and directly 
to the ten Member States, which joined the EU as of 1 May 2004.3 
It should be noticed that the Insolvency Regulation itself aims to fill a gap that 
deliberately was left, nearly forty years ago, in the 1968 Brussels Convention on 
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters. Article 1(1) of this Convention excluded from its scope insolvency 
proceedings relating to the winding-up of insolvent companies or other legal 
persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous proceedings. The 
EU Insolvency Regulation has closed this gap, while the Brussels Convention 
has been transformed into a Regulation as of 1 March 2002.4 Article 1(2) 
Brussels Regulation 2002 contains the same exclusion. Article 1(2) EU 
Insolvency Regulation, in its turn, excludes from its scope insolvency 
proceedings concerning insurance undertakings, credit institutions, investment 
undertakings, holding funds or securities for third parties, and collective 
investment undertakings. The Winding-Up Directives for both groups of 
financial institutions, the insurance undertakings5 and the credit institutions,6 are 
                                                 
3 Some smaller changes, based on Article 20 of the Act of Accession (O.J. L 236 of 23 September 
2003) have led to a consolidated version of the Insolvency Regulation, see http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/consleg /reg/en_register_1920.html. In April 2005, the Annexes A, B and C to the Insolvency 
Regulation have been amended, see O.J. L of 20 April 2005, pp. 1-8. 
4  Council Regulation No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000, O.J. 2001 L 12/1. 
5  O.J. L 110 of 20 April 2001.  
6  O.J. L 125 of 5 May 2001. See Deguée, The Winding Up Directive Finally Establishes Uniform 
Private Law for Banking Insolvency Proceedings, in: European Business Law Review (EBLR) 
2004, 99. 




generally seen as to fill the gap left by the Insolvency Regulation (InsReg).7 
Article 25 InsReg aligns the recognition and enforceability of insolvency related 
judgments (concerning the course and the closure of insolvency proceedings and 
court approved compositions) with the Brussels Regulation 2002. Systematically 
judgments, which are not covered by the Winding-Up Directives, fall within the 
scope of the Brussels Regulation 2002.8  
 
 
3 A special position for financial institutions 
 
The aforementioned Directives 2001/17 and 2001/24 are the logic result from 
the fact that the EU Insolvency Regulation expressly excludes from its scope 
insolvency proceedings concerning banks and insurance companies. According 
to recital 9 to the Insolvency Regulation the Regulation should apply to 
insolvency proceedings, whether the debtor is a natural person or a legal person, 
a trader or an individual.9 Insolvency proceedings concerning the 
aforementioned institutions and undertakings ‘(…) should be excluded from the 
scope of this Regulation. Such undertakings should not be covered by this 
Regulation since they are subject to special arrangements and, to some extend, 
the national supervisory authorities have extremely wide-ranging powers of 
intervention.’ From the Virgós/Schmit Report (1996), para. 55, it can be taken 
that the exclusion of credit institutions and insurance undertakings was agreed to 
by all Member States only after a statement by the Council and the Commission 
regarding the need to step up work on insolvency proceedings involving 
institutions and undertakings referred to in Article 1(2) InsReg.10 The inter-
                                                 
7 See in this way Paulus, Banken und Insolvenz – eine Internationale Betrachtung, Zeitschrift für 
Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaftrecht (ZBB) 15. December 2002, 457ff, and Pannen, Krise und 
Insolvenz bei Kreditinstituten, 2. Auflage, Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2005, 213. 
8 There is still a gap with regard to insolvency proceedings concerning investment undertakings 
which provide services involving the holding of funds or securities for third parties, or to collective 
investment undertakings, see Braun/Heinrich, Finanzdienstleister in der ‘grensüber-schreitenden’ 
Insolvenz – Lücken im System?, in: Neue Zeitschrift für das Recht der Insolvenz und Sanierung 
(NZI), November 2005, 578ff. 
9 The insolvency proceedings to which the Insolvency Regulation applies are listed in the Annexes A 
and B to the Regulation. 
10 The Report Virgós/Schmit (1996) was drawn up as an extensive explanation of the draft-Convention 
1995. The Report itself however never has been agreed by the Ministers of Justice of the Member 
States, as the draft-Convention due to political reasons, never came into being. Nevertheless, 
because the content of the draft-Convention 1995 and the Insolvency Regulation is nearly the same, 
the Report has an important interpretative status. This position is quite uniformly taken in literature 
and by courts. See for Netherlands Supreme Court 9 January 2004, JOR 2004/87, with my 
comments; NIPR 2004, 41 (Fortis v. Vennink); High Court of Justice Chancery Division Leeds 20 
May 2004 (Ci4Net.Com Inc.), ZIP 2004, 1769; Irish Supreme Court 27 July 2004 [2004] IESC 47 
(Re the Matter of Eurofoods IFSC Ltd); District Court Dordrecht 11 Augustus 2004 LJN: AQ6547; 





pretation of the excluded entities and undertakings in Article 1(2) InsReg are not 
defined by the Regulation itself, but by definitions in other instruments of 
Community law.  
The reasons for this special position of credit institutions lay in the typically 
financial nature of a bank as a debtor (highly liquid liabilities) and its specific 
role in a country’s economy, see Hüpkes.11 Generally, these are the main 
reasons to treat banks differently. In the banking community it is furthermore 
generally recognized that one bank’s failure may lead to the failure of many 
banks, thus causing a chain reaction and widespread failures and the realization 
of systemic risk. The Underpinnings Contact Group, in its 2002-report on 
‘Insolvency Arrangements and Contract Enforceability’,12 defines systemic risk 
as ‘(…) the risk that the failure of a participant to meet its contractual 
obligations may in turn cause other participants to default, with the chain 
reaction leading to broader financial difficulties’. The Group adds: ‘Adequate 
insolvency regimes can contribute to the avoidance of such chain reactions, and 
thereby systemic risk, by allowing for orderly liquidation or appropriate 
reorganisation measures and by ensuring that collateral security rights can be 
enforced and the performance of contracts honoured.’13 For these reasons credit 
institutions should be treated differently with regard to insolvency issues in 
comparison with ‘common’ businesses. 
 
 
4 Applicable sector principles 
 
The work regarding the Directive 2001/24 flows from the First Banking 
Directive of 197814 on the harmonization of the rules of authorization, during 
which the need for appropriate rules dealing with insolvency already was felt. 
The EC Commission’s objective was to transpose the principle of ‘home country 
control’, laid down in the First Banking Directive, to the regulatory framework 
                                                                                                                   
LJN: AU5330 (Collins & Aikman Automotive Trim B.V.) stating ‘the Virgós/Schmit Report, so 
significant for the Regulations’ interpretation.’  
11 Hüpkes, The Legal Aspects of Bank Insolvency. A Comparative Analysis of Western Europe, the 
United States and Canada, Studies in Comparative Corporate and Financial Law, Volume 10, 
Kluwer Law International 2000, 7. 
12 Source: Contact Group on the Legal and Institutional Underpinnings of the International Financial 
System, Bank for International Settlements, September 2002 (available via <<www.bis.org>> or 
<<www.ecb.org>>). See Appendix A on ‘Cross-border Aspects of Insolvency’, p. A26.  
13 According to The Economist January 24th 2004, Italian banks’ lending exposure to Parmalat is an 
estimated € 2.3 billion, about half the lending exposure of all banks in Italy. Nevertheless, there is 
‘little systemic risk for Italy’s banks as a whole’, while the loans are spread among many 
international institutions, including some 15 Italian banks.  
14 Directive 77/780/EC, which evolved in the Banking Directive 2000 (O.J. L 12 of 26 May 2000, 1, 
as amended by Directive 2000/28/EC (O.J. L 275 of 27 October 2000, p. 37). See in general: Dale, 
Regulatory Consequences of the BCCI Collapse: US, UK, EC, Basle Committee – Current Issues in 
International Bank Supervision, in: Norton, Cheng and Fletcher (eds.), International Banking 
Regulation and Supervision: Change and Transformation in the 1990s (1994), 377ff. 




for the reorganization and winding-up of credit institutions. Aforementioned 
financial institutions operate according to the principle of one single license, 
issued by one Member State, but applicable in all Member States, allowing the 
institution to carry out its activities in the Community by means of establishment 
or free provision of services without any further authorization by the host 
Member State and under the sole prudential supervision of the home Member 
State supervisory authorities (therefore: ‘home country control’). The single 
license idea relates to the credit institution in one Member State and its branches 
in other Member States (so called ‘single entity’). For this reason the Directives 
provide for only one main insolvency proceedings, to avoid unnecessary 
interference because of a secondary insolvency proceeding in another member 
State.  
Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that both Directives broaden the 
regulatory framework with regard to (prudential) supervision on insurance 
undertakings and credit institutions. Directive 2001/17 states in recital 3, that the 
insurance directives, which are providing a single authorization with a 
Community scope to the insurance undertakings, do not contain coordination 
rules in the event of winding-up proceedings. It follows: ‘Insurance 
undertakings as well as other financial institutions are expressly excluded from 
the scope of Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on 
insolvency proceedings. It is in the interest of the proper functioning of the 
internal market and of the protection of creditors that coordinated rules are 
established at Community level for winding-up proceedings in respect of 
insurance undertakings.’ These rules will be in line with the existing system of 
the European Community legislative framework on the coordination of laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions with regard to the taking up and 
pursuit of the business of these institutions.  
The Italian author Galanti submits that the rules concerning private international 
law, which are included in Directive 2001/24, are placed in a more important 
and overall framework of exchange of information and cooperation among 
authorities: ‘The circumstance that banks and insurance undertakings are subject 
to prudential supervision accounts for the allocation of the crisis directives in the 
EC law derived law in these sectors, thus giving to the rules on private 
international law a secondary role.’15 A step further is the opinion of the Belgian 
author Torremans16 who states: ‘The final aim is therefore not so much to 
exclude these entities from the scope of the [Insolvency] Regulation, as to put in 
place a tailor-made special regime for them’. Within the banking sector this 
view is held too. The Underpinnings Contact Group, in its 2002-report on 
‘Insolvency Arrangements and Contract Enforceability’ underlines the backup 
                                                 
15 Galanti, The New EC Law on Banking Crisis, in: International Insolvency Review 2002, 49 et seq. 
16 Torremans, Cross Border Insolvencies in EU, English and Belgian Law, European Monographs nr. 





function of the rules with regard to insolvency of banks to the rules with regard 
to prudential supervision: ‘The principles of home country control, minimum 
harmonization and mutual recognition – forming the core of the market 
integration principles for financial markets – have also been transposed in the 
field of insolvency procedures and constitute the basis of the Winding-up 
Directive for insurance undertakings and the Winding-up Directive for credit 
institutions. In particular, the home country and mutual recognition principles – 
being introduced by the First and Second Banking Co-ordination Directives, 
respectively – are extended to the insolvency of credit institutions’.  
It can be taken from the above that Directive 2001/24 therefore forms an integral 
part of the EU’s legislative framework on the coordination of laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions with regard to the taking up and pursuit of the 
business of credit institutions as evolved into the 2000 Banking Directive. The 
Directive is to be seen as to complement the Banking Directives (in addition to 
taking up business and pursuit of business, now: the winding up or 
reorganization of the activities) and to fill the legal vacuum. In the text of 
Directive 2001/24, its complementary function to the 2000 Banking Directive is 
easy to recognize in adopted definitions (e.g. home Member State; host Member 
State; branch; competent authorities) and in provisions relating to information 
with regard to branches of third-countries or the procedure with regard to the 
withdrawal of authority.  
 
 
5 Different basis in the EC Treaty  
 
The preamble to Directive 2001/24 refers to the Directive’s legal foundation 
within the EC Treaty and especially Art. 47(2) EC Treaty and the directives for 
the coordination of the national laws with regard to the taking up and pursuit of 
activities as self-employed persons. Its foundation, therefore, is the principle of 
free establishment or of free provision of services without any further 
authorization by the host Member State. In general this legal basis is supported 
by a well-established broad interpretation of this norm, which was already 
employed as legal basis for the Banking Directives since the 70s, which 
preceded the 2000 Banking Directive.17 During the preparatory work it has been 
recognized that the main topic of the Directive would be its rules on private 
international law, which would – like with the EU Insolvency Regulation – 
bring the subject matter within the area of judicial cooperation in civil matters in 
order to establish progressively an area of freedom, security and justice (Art. 
61(c) EC Treaty). This would, amongst other, mean that the European Court of 
Justice only would be able to provide guidance for interpretation when in a 
Member State the court of the highest instance would approach the ECJ. It was 
                                                 
17 Galanti, The New EC Law on Banking Crisis, in: International Insolvency Review 2002, 49. 




nevertheless considered that Art. 47(2) EC Treaty could be a suitable legal basis 
as far as such norms on insolvency law and civil law could be regarded as just 
accessories and not at the main topic of the Directives. In cases, covered by the 
Directives, therefore courts in the first instance are authorized to refer questions 
to the ECJ.18  
 
  
6 Main universal proceeding; no secondary proceedings 
 
The applicable sector principles with regard to banks and insurance companies 
are the main point of view for a different model than the model adopted for the 
Insolvency Regulation. The Regulation is based on a system of what is called 
‘mitigated universality’. Jurisdiction of courts of a Member State according to 
the Insolvency Regulation is based on the general principle that ‘the courts of 
the Member State within the territory of which the centre of the debtor’s main 
interests is situated shall have jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings’, see 
Article 3(1). For a company or legal person, the presumption is that the centre of 
the debtors’ main interests (COMI) is the place of its registered office, but this 
presumption may be rebutted (Article 3(1) last line). The insolvency proceeding 
opened is called a main proceeding. Its most important consequence is that the 
law applicable to insolvency proceedings under the Regulation is that ‘of the 
Member State within the territory of which such proceedings are opened’, see 
Article 4(1), thus: lex concursus, and that this consequence shall be recognized 
automatically in all other Member States (Article 16). In addition, the court of 
another Member State than the State of opening main proceedings shall only 
have jurisdiction, if ‘the debtor possesses an establishment within the territory of 
that other Member State’ (Article 3(2)).19 The effects of the latter proceedings – 
referred to as secondary proceedings – are however restricted to the assets of the 
debtor situated in the territory of the other Member State (Article 3(2) last line) 
and this proceeding may only be a winding-up proceeding. In the framework of 
main proceedings and secondary proceedings one notes the combination of 
universality and territoriality, as referred to above. 
The ‘centre of main interests’ (COMI) should correspond to the place where the 
debtor conducts the administration of his interests on a regular basis and is 
therefore ascertainable by third parties, as Recital 13 provides. In some 80 
                                                 
18 Art. 43 InsReg (Applicability in time as per 31 May 2002) is a logical provision for a Regulation, as 
a Regulation is binding and directly applicable in Member States. The Directives both have to be 
implemented in the laws of the Member States. Although the ultimate implementation dates are 
given (Insurance Undertakings: 20 April 2003; Credit institutions: 5 May 2004), as indicated earlier, 
in practice not all Member States have succeeded to enact legislation before these dates.  
19 Article 2(h) provides that for the purposes of the EU Insolvency Regulation an ‘establishment’ shall 
mean ‘any place of operations where the debtor carries out a non-transitory economic activity with 





percent of all court cases from the mid 02s 20 until now the determination of 
COMI is the principle point of legal conflict, with highly debated cases like 
Daisytek (involving sixteen subsidiaries in UK, Germany and France)21 and 
Parmalat (involving Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands and Luxembourg). The 
outcome of the question ‘where is the centre of main interest?’ in these decisions 
is based on many facts and circumstances, amongst (very many) others the fact 
that:  
(i) The day to day administration is conducted in the forum State (Ireland),  
(ii) The directors possessed the forum’s nationality (Italy),22 
(iii) The (Delaware incorporated) company had presented itself to its most 
substantial creditor as having its principle executive offices in the forum 
State (England),23 
(iv) The debtor (natural person) has maintained, with regard to the substantial 
interests in a large number of companies established in the forum State, to 
administer these commercial interest in the forum State (the Netherlands),24 
(v) The director (of an Irish incorporated company, being a wholly owned 
subsidiary of a UK company) was based in the UK and was solely 
responsible for the companies business,25 
(vi) Some remaining contractual works (conducted by a company incorporated 
in Finland) were still in progress in the forum State (Sweden),26 
(vii)The group’s parent company (of an Austrian company with its seat in 
Innsbruck) is located in the forum State (Germany),27 
(viii)The company (registered in the UK with a postal address in Spain) is a 
partner in a Swedish limited partnership (‘kommanditbolag’) (Sweden),28 
and even 
(ix) The codes to the computer programmes of the debtor company (registered in 
the UK, postal address in the UK, premises in Sweden) are stored in the 
forum State (Sweden).29 
 
The European Court of Justice’s decision in Parmelat will probably provide 
some guidelines to determine COMI with more predictability. It is expected in 
the spring of 2006. 
  
                                                 
20 Sources or extracts of some 100 court cases can be found at <<www.eir-database.com>>. 
21 These European subsidiaries were left out of a filing of a Chapter 11 U.S. Bankruptcy Code case in 
the USA (Dallas, Texas) for the overall holding of Daisytek International, Inc.  
22 Court of Parma 19 February 2004 in Re Eurofood IFSC Limited. 
23 Court of Leeds (Ch. D) 20 May 2004 Re Ci4net.com Inc and Re DBP Holdings Limited. 
24 Netherlands Supreme Court 9 January 2004, JOR 2004/87, with my commentary.  
25 High Court London (Ch. D) 2 July 2004 in Re Aim Underwriting Agencies (Ireland) Ltd. 
26 Svea Court of Appeal 30 May 2003 (No. Ö 4105-03). 
27 Court of Munich 4 May 2004 in Re Hettlage KgaA. 
28 Court of Appeal Skåne and Blekinge 3 February 2005 (Ö 21-05). 
29 Court of Stockholm 21 January 2005 (K 17664-04). 




In the Directives the jurisdiction of courts is not based on COMI and secondary 
proceedings can not be opened. The idea is that in the single entity approach30 a 
bank is wound up as one legal entity and that the supervision of the home 
Member State should not be interrupted. For this reason Article 3(1) Directive 
2001/24 captures the question of the exclusive international regulatory authority 
(‘jurisdiction’) and the principle of unity. Exclusive jurisdiction is provided to 
the home Member State’s administrative or judicial authorities to decide on the 
implementation of one or more reorganization measures. Decisive is (not COMI, 
but) the institution’s registered seat. The single entity approach follows from the 
addressees of the measures ‘in’ a credit institution ‘including branches 
established in other Member States’. Article 9(1) with regard to winding-up 
proceedings contains too the provision of international jurisdiction and the 
single entity approach, see recital 10:  
 
 ‘Only the competent authorities of the home Member State should be 
empowered to take decisions on winding-up proceedings concerning 
insurance undertakings (principle of unity). These proceedings should 
produce their effects throughout the Community and should be recognised 
by all Member States. All the assets and liabilities of the insurance 
undertaking should, as a general rule, be taken into consideration in the 
winding-up proceedings (principle of universality).’  
 
The assets of the bank in its home State jurisdiction are therefore encompassed 
in the liquidation, which assets include the assets of branches in a host State 
jurisdiction.31 All worldwide creditors can prove their claims in the unified 
proceeding, to which the lex concursus of the opening State applies. As 
secondary proceedings under the applicable unity principle are not allowed, 
Articles 27-38 InsReg (Secondary proceedings) are not mirrored in the Winding-
Up Directives, which makes sense. For this reason the duty to cooperate and 
communicate information between insolvency liquidators (Article 31 InsReg) 
has no mirror rule in the Directives, as these do not provide a system of main 
and secondary proceedings. Finally, the public policy defence of Article 26 
InsReg, which is aimed at the refusal to recognize insolvency proceedings 
opened in another Member State or a judgment handed down in this context, 
does not work in the single entity approach. This approach presumes automatic 
recognition and does not allow a host Member State to call in its public policy 
                                                 
30 Recital 4 Directive 2001/24 states that where, while in operation, a credit institution and its branches 
form a single entity, which is subject to the supervision of the competent authorities of the State 
where authorization valid throughout the Community was granted, it would be ‘(…) particularly 
undesirable to relinquish such unity’ between an institution and its branches where it is necessary to 
adopt reorganization measures or open winding-up proceedings.  
31 See Article 1 point 7 of the 2000 Banking Directive: host Member State is the Member State in 





against a reorganization measure of a winding-up decision which has its source 
in the home Member State.  
 
 
7 Effects outside the Community 
 
The Insolvency Regulation deals primarily with intra-Community effects of 
cross-border insolvency matters. Virgós and Garcimartín use the ‘Dan 
Brownisch’ expression: ‘The Community Connection’.32  
The territorial scope of the Directives 2001/17 and 2004/24 is wider and include 
all 25 Member States, therefore including Denmark.33 In addition, the single 
entity-approach, with one European license, includes all of the EEA (European 
Economic Area), which would be the EU Member States plus Norway, Iceland 
and Liechtenstein. 
Now, to the non-EU banks. The provisions of Directive 2001/24 concerning the 
branches of a credit institution having a head office outside the Community shall 
apply, but only where that institution has branches in at least two Member States 
of the Community, see Article 1(2) providing a de minimis-rule when it comes 
to the reach of this Directive beyond the EC Community. Directive 2001/24 
applies to the branches of a non EC bank when such bank ‘has branches in at 
least two Member States of the Community’. The way it applies has to be taken 
from recital 22: ‘Where a credit institution which has its head office outside the 
Community possesses branches in more than one Member State, each branch 




8 Specific types of measures  
 
Article 1(1) InsReg defines the scope of the applicability of the Insolvency 
Regulation. It shall apply to ‘collective insolvency proceedings which entail the 
partial or total divestment of a debtor and the appointment of a liquidator.’ 
                                                 
32 Virgós/Garcimartín, o.c., 22. 
33 Based on figures presented in the European Central Bank report ‘Structural Analysis of the EU 
Banking Sector, Year 2001’ (November 2002) one may deduce that in the beginning of 2004 in 15 
EU Member States some 7500 credit institutions operate. The number of branches of credit 
institutions from EEA countries will be over 500. 
34 It is discussed whether it is the intention in a situation of a non-EC bank with two or more branches 
to provide for a single insolvency proceeding in relation to all the branches within a Member State. 
The text of Directive 2001/24 is unclear and therefore it is uncertain which court should open 
unitary insolvency proceedings and whether assets of both branches should be pooled together in 
one single proceeding, see my article Non-EU Insurance Companies and Banks and the EU 
Directives 2001/17 and 2001/24 on Reorganisation and Winding-Up of Insurance Undertakings and 
Credit Institutions, in: Wessels, Current Topics of International Insolvency Law, Kluwer, Deventer, 
2004, 309. 




Several key definitions with regard to the Directives relate to ‘reorganisation 
measures’ which fall outside the scope of the definition of an ‘insolvency 
proceeding’. Reorganisation measures shall mean measures ‘(…) which are 
intended to preserve or restore the financial situation of a credit institution and 
which could affect third parties’ pre-existing rights, including measures invol-
ving the possibility of a suspension of payments, suspension of enforcement 
measures or reduction of claims’ (art. 2, 7th dash Directive 2001/24). In the 
definition of ‘reorganisation measures’ the principle elements are (i) the aim of 
the measure, as a measure, which is intended to preserve or restore the financial 
situation of a credit institution, and (ii) the effect of the measure, as a measure 
could affect third parties’ pre-existing rights. Measures of this type include 
measures involving the possibility of a suspension of payments, suspension of 
enforcement measures or reduction of claims. The second set of activities to be 
initiated under the Directives are: winding-up proceedings. The words ‘winding-
up proceedings’ shall mean ‘collective proceedings opened and monitored by 
the administrative or judicial authorities of a Member State with the aim of 
realising assets under the supervision of those authorities, including where the 
proceedings are terminated by a composition or other, similar measure’ (article 
2, 8th dash Directive 2001/24).35 It seems there may be some detailed 
differences between the latter one and ‘insolvency proceedings’, which include 
‘winding-up proceedings’ (as meant in Article 2(c) InsReg). For the purposes of 
this article it is sufficient to note the different types of proceedings. It can be 
noted here that descriptions of ‘measures’ and ‘proceedings’ in the Directives 
are not supported by Annexes, which lists mentions in each Member State’s 
authentic language, the type of measures or proceedings concerned, as Annexes 
A and B to the Insolvency Regulation do.  
 
 
9 Conflict of Law Rules: Lex Domus 
 
Article 4(1) InsReg to insolvency proceedings, which concern natural persons or 
(non-financial) legal persons, lays down the rules on applicable law to the main 
insolvency proceedings. This law is the so called lex concursus, the law of the 
Member State of which the court has opened these proceedings. This law 
governs all the conditions for the opening, conduct and closure of the insolvency 
proceedings, the admissibility of claims and the rules on distribution and 
preferences, etc, in all 24 Member States. Art. 10(1) Directive 2001/24 contains 
a similar rule of the applicable law to the winding-up proceeding. A credit 
                                                 
35 The definitions of ‘winding-up proceedings’ in both Directives differ. The definition in Art. 2(d) 
Directive 2001/17 adds to the wordings in Art. 2, 9th dash Directive 2001/24, ending with ‘(…) by a 
composition or other, similar measure’, the wording ‘(…) by a composition or other analogous 





institution is wound up in accordance with ‘(…) the laws, regulations and 
procedures’ applicable in its home Member State insofar as the Directive 
2001/24 does not provide otherwise. The first part lays down the same rule as 
applies ex Article 4(1) InsReg. There is one difference, though. Article 10(1) 
Directive 2001/24 does not determine that the ‘law’ of the home Member State 
is universally applicable, it provides that ‘the laws’ (plural) and ‘(…) regulations 
and procedures’ of the home Member State are applicable. To symbolize (at 
least in its wording) this broader regime I suggest to refer to ‘laws, regulations 
and practices’ as the ‘lex domus’, in contrast to the lex concursus as meant in 
Article 4(1) InsReg. These procedural and substantive effects of the lex 
concursus are in a broad sense quite typical for insolvency law and are also 
necessary for the insolvency proceedings to fulfil its aims, but it is submitted 
that it has a much wider effect for banks in that lex domus includes ‘regulations’ 
and ‘procedures’ not being ‘law’ in a strict sense, e.g. regulations following 
from capital adequacy standards, from information standards to use in reporting 
lines to the supervisory authorities, preventive procedures with regard to safety 
in use of technology or supervisory procedures based on a cross-border 
Memorandum of Understanding concerning coordination and cooperation 
between supervisory authorities in different (Member) States or certain internal 
regulated measures concerning to prevent financing ‘terrorism’. 
 
 
10 Conflict of Law Rules: exclusions 
 
The central starting point of Directive 2001/24 is that the ‘laws, regulations and 
procedures’ applicable in the home country (lex domus) determine re-
organization measures or winding-up proceedings. During the final negotiations 
of the draft-Directive a group of exceptions to the applicability of the lex domus 
has been inserted, e.g. employment contracts remain subject to the law of the 
Member State whose legislation was applicable to the employment contract and 
a contract conferring the right to make use of or acquire immovable property is 
governed by the law of the Member State in whose territory the immovable 
property is situated (lex rei sitae), and rights with respect to immovable property 
(including ships and aircrafts), subject to registration, are governed by the law of 
the Member State under the authority of which the register is kept, see Article 
20(a)-20(c) Directive 2001/24. Both in these situations as with regard to rights 
in rem, reservation of title and the right to set-off (Article 21-23 Directive 
2001/24) the Directive adopted in principle the rules as arranged in the 
Insolvency Regulation. Hüpkes notes that there is concern that such a conflict of 
law rule is not specific enough and would need further elaboration.36 These 
                                                 
36 Hüpkes, o.c., 168, explains that the status of rights in rem and reservation of title rights are typically 
determined not only by the law of the location of the assets, but also by the law governing the 




concerns equally relate to the interpretation of e.g. Article 5-7 InsReg and 
therefore literature and court cases analyses on applying these articles are of 
interest for the proper understanding of the conflict of law rules in the 
Directives.37 
In the banking sector three other Directives are paramount with regard to insol-
vency questions, the EU Directive on Deposit-guarantee schemes (1994/19), the 
Settlement Finality Directive (1998/26) and the June 2002 Directive 2002/47 on 
financial collateral arrangements (the EU Collateral Directive). The two latter 
ones create specific legal regimes which in general are forthcoming to the 
international banking practice. This approach seems to have been followed in 
the Directive 2001/24 in that protection is offered to positions based on specific 
financial contracts, e.g. with regard to netting and repurchase agreements, see 
the next paragraph. The Insurance Directive 2001/17 contains certain provisions 
with regard to harmonizing the system of protection of rights of policy holders, 
see Article 10-12 with regard to the protection of insurance claims, including 
these of policyholders.38  
 
 
11 The Treatment of Financial Contracts 
 
Article 25 of Directive 2001/24 provides: ‘Netting agreements shall be governed 
solely by the law of the contract which governs such agreements’, and Article 26 
determines: ‘Without prejudice to Article 24, repurchase agreements shall be 
governed solely by the law of the contract which governs such agreements.’ 
Galanti39 reports that the introduction of these exceptions to the lex domus, 
provided for in Article 25 and 26 have been vigorously debated in the last phase 
of the preparatory works for the Directive. The exceptions apply, instead of the 
lex domus, the lex contractus.40Two opposite stances emerged during these 
discussions. The first was against the introduction of these exceptions. The view 
was taken to limit as much as possible the number of exceptions, which were 
perceived as not consistent with the universality principle and the original nature 
of the proposal. In this view it was underlined that some of these exceptions 
                                                                                                                   
underlying contract. In the insolvency context, the law governing the insolvency proceedings 
ultimately determines the extent to which those rights can effectively be realized in a winding-up, 
sometimes resulting in a preferred treatment of holders of these rights.  
37 See my article The Secured Creditor in Cross-border Finance Transactions Under the EU 
Insolvency Regulation, in: Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation, Volume 18, Issue 
3, 2003, 135. 
38 See critically on the rationale and the lack of detail my article A Glance Through the Legal 
Principles and Key Issues of Multinational Bank Insolvency, in: Wessels, Current Topics of 
International Insolvency Law, Kluwer, Deventer, 2004, 259. 
39 Galanti, The New EC Law on Banking Crisis, in: International Insolvency Review 2002, p. 61. 






were first introduced to safeguard transactions carried out in payment, netting or 
settlement systems which, eventually, found suitable protection under the 
Settlement Finality Directive. The second stance, which was pro introduction, 
was essentially based on the argument that such norms have a scope broader 
than the Settlement Finality Directive ones, encompassing – beyond the systems 
and the markets and therefore reaching not only the settlement but also – the 
dealing and the bilateral ‘netting’ agreements. An additional argument was 
found in the positive effect of the norms in terms of continuity of the applicable 
law even in case of insolvency.  
Recital 23 and 24 to Directive 2001/24 underline the special position of the 
exempted agreements, by stating that in some cases ‘… reference to the law of 
another Member State represents an unavoidable qualification of the principle 
that the law of the home Member State is to apply, … especially necessary to 
protect … the integrity of regulated markets functioning in accordance with the 
law of a Member State on which financial instruments are traded.’ The 
exclusions, however, in the text of Article 25 and 26 adopt a wider view. 
Agreements meant in Article 25 and 26 ‘shall be governed solely by the law of 
the contract’ which governs such agreements. Galanti notes that a serious 
assessment of the windfall in terms of competition among legal systems was 
lacking: ‘In (…) repurchase agreements (…) the parties (…) can usually choose 
the law applicable to such legal relationships without any territorial constraint. 
In such a framework, the exception to the principle of application of the lex 
concursus allows the financial intermediaries to choose the most favorable law 
in terms of effects of the insolvency on these contracts. The intermediaries are 
there advantaged vis-à-vis the other creditors and counterparts of the disrupted 
bank and there is a risk of competition among legal systems in reducing the 
negative effects of the insolvency on such contracts. The stance pro exceptions 
already prevailed at Council level but, following the opinion of the EU 
Parliament, the link with a Member State law was eventually erased in favor of 
the lex contractus in general which could lead, in the future, to a 
disintermediation of the European markets.’41 
Given the text and its history the references to the lex contractus in Articles 25 
and 26 are to be understood as to refer to the law which the parties choose to 
apply to their contract (netting or repurchase contract) and this law could also be 
the law of a non-EEA State. This approach has several disadvantages, including 
the uneven treatment of creditors and depositors (as far as they are not protected 
by a scheme). Cercone submits that the application of the lex contractus in the 
aforementioned way is ‘excessive’. This author wishes to read in the lex 
concursus a reference ‘to the statutory laws applicable to the relationship; 
statutory laws could then permit the parties to exercise self-governing powers, 
                                                 
41 Galanti, The New EC Law on Banking Crisis, in: International Insolvency Review 2002, p. 61. 




but always within certain limits and conditions.’42 Although it is not entirely 
clear what is meant here, a narrow interpretation may be desirable, even though 
it may not follow from the history and the text of the provisions itself.  
 
The Insolvency Regulation, although not applicable to credit institutions, 
provides for a special rule with regard to the agreements mentioned and 
transactions, dealt with in Articles 25 to 27 of the Directive. Article 9(1) 
Insolvency Regulation (Payment systems and financial markets) provides the 
following:  
 
 ‘Without prejudice to Article 5, the effects of insolvency proceedings on the 
rights and obligations of the parties to a payment or settlement system or to 
a financial market shall be governed solely by the law of the Member State 
applicable to that system or market.’  
 
Recital 27 to the Insolvency Regulation states: ‘There is also a need for special 
protection in the case of payment systems and financial markets. This applies for 
example to the position-closing agreements and netting agreements to be found 
in such systems as well as to the sale of securities and to the guarantees provided 
for such transactions as governed in particular by the [Settlement Finality 
Directive]. For such transactions, the only law which is material should thus be 
that applicable to the system or market concerned. This provision is intended to 
prevent the possibility of mechanisms for the payment and settlement of 
transactions provided for in the payment and set-off systems or on the regulated 
financial markets of the Member States being altered in the case of insolvency 
of a business partner’, adding that the Settlement Finality Directive contains 
special provisions which should take precedence over the general rules in the 
Insolvency Regulation. Articles 25 to 27 of the Directive seem to follow this 
path.  
It is very unfortunate that the word ‘netting’ has not been defined. Recital 25 of 
Directive 2001/24 seems to limit the netting agreements as meant in Article 25 
of the Directive by providing that transactions carried out in the framework of a 
payment and settlement system are covered by the Settlement Finality Directive, 
although it merely repeats what already is found in the (recital to the) Insolvency 
Regulation. Also recital 26 of Directive 2001/24 seems to narrow the width of 
Article 25, by saying that the adoption of Directive 2001/24 does not call into 
question the provisions of the Settlement Finality Directive to which insolvency 
proceedings must not have any effect on the enforceability of orders validly 
entered into a system, or on collateral provided for a system. Probably Article 25 
                                                 
42 Cercone, European Community Directive on Reorganization and Winding-up of Credit Institutions; 
Exceptions to the Application of the lex concursus (Title IV, Articles 20-27 and 30-32), in: 





covers bilateral close out netting,43 but parties may wish to stress ‘netting’ into 
all sorts of intertwined transactions with set-off elements. It is submitted that 
because a party in a netting arrangement luckily escapes the lex domus of the 
reorganisation measures or the winding-up proceedings, to the detriment of 
other creditors, a very narrow interpretation of what ‘netting’ represents is to be 
applied.44 With regard to repurchase agreements the Financial Settlement 
Directive 98/26/EC already protected repurchase agreements, whilst a repo 
transaction concluded by or for the benefit of a credit institution in its capacity 
as participant in a payment or securities settlement system or for the benefit of 
central banks shall not be affected by insolvency proceedings. Like Article 25 
(netting agreements), Article 26 (repos) seems unfinished, as a definition of 
‘repurchase agreement’ is missing as is a provision stating that Article 26 – the 
same goes for Article 25 – shall not preclude any action for voidness, voidability 
or unenforceability which may be taken to set aside netting agreement under the 
law of the contract which governs such agreements.45 Like netting the sanctity 
of a repo, following from its importance for the stability for the financial 





Now back to the contention of the Spanish professors Virgós and Garcimartín in 
that the Insolvency Regulation constitutes the general rule, where the Directives 
2001/17 and 2001/24 form special rules, but ‘(…) they all form the ‘hermeneutic 
circle’ within which interpretations should be made. The idea that all these rules 
must be seen as parts of a consistent (although unfinished) statutory scheme is 
important’.  
It is submitted that within the field of the regulation of insolvency or ‘near-
insolvency’ situations the Winding-Up Directives 2001/17 and 2001/24 form an 
                                                 
43 See: Wessels, Close-out Netting in the Netherlands, Journal of International Banking Law, Vol. 12 
Issue 5, May 1997, 187, reprinted in: Wessels, Business and Bankruptcy Law in the Netherlands; 
Selected Essays, Kluwer Law International, The Hague-London-Boston, 1999. As netting is not 
defined it should, at least, be understood as referring to ‘the essentially bilateral process of close-
out, conversion of obligations into monetary claims, and mutual set-off’, according to European 
Financial Markets Lawyers Group, Protection for Bilateral Insolvency Set-off and Netting 
Agreements under EC Law, October 2004, p. 42 (available through www.efmlg.org). The Group 
has studied Article 6 Insolvency Regulation and Article 25 Directive 2001/24 to conclude that the 
legal protection for close-out netting provisions is highly uncertain, for which reason it recommends 
to redifine the term ‘close-out netting provision’ in Article 2(1)(n) of the Collateral Directive 
2002/47. 
44 I leave aside characterisation of netting as ‘sett-off’ to which again different rules apply, see Article 
6 Insolvency Regulation and Article 24 Directive 2001/24. 
45 See for Article 26 in a broader context: Deguée, The Winding Up Directive Finally Establishes 
Uniform Private Law for Banking Insolvency Proceedings, in: European Business Law Review 
(EBLR) 2004, 114. 




important part of the legal and regulatory framework concerning the European 
single market for the insurance and the banking sector. I have demonstrated 
though that both Directives encompass three principles, namely (i) ‘single 
entity’, the credit institution in the home Member State and the branch in 
another Member State form one legal entity, (ii) ‘unity’, resulting in only one 
competent authority, exclusively empowering the home country authority, or 
one winding-up proceeding with no secondary proceedings elsewhere,46 and (iii) 
‘universality’, the effects of reorganization measures or winding-up proceedings 
and its applicable law (lex domus being the ‘lex concursus’) shall in principle 
apply throughout the whole Community. Both Directives add an important 
component to the rather fresh EU rules regarding jurisdiction, recognition and 
conflict of law rules concerning insolvency proceedings. The Directives require 
an early exchange of information between supervising authorities and enable for 
coordination of reorganization measures or winding-up proceedings for 
insurance undertakings and banks with branches in other Member States. Both 
Directives are EU legal measures and therefore obviously the natural limitation 
applies: the Directives mainly focus on Europe, including the other EEA 
countries, although they both contain several provisions, which are of 
importance for branches of non-EU insurance undertakings and credit 
institutions.  
The last five years indeed in Europe a framework for insolvency has been 
established. When European insolvency legislation (including supervisory rules 
and insolvency law) would be seen as one painting, it strikes that it is still 
unfinished (lacking rules for (collective) investment undertakings), with some 
conflicting lines (doubtful justification for different treatment of financial 
institutions), some mismatching colours (principle of coordinated universality, 
which includes secondary proceedings, in the Insolvency Regulation versus the 
principle of unity and universality in both Directives) and some parts which 
differ in its perspective of the daylight (certain elements of Directive 2001/24 
need to be interpreted in the context of the 2000 Banking Directive).47 Taste and 
appreciation comes into play when answering the question whether the painting 
is realistic. Quite some corporations and banking organizations conduct their 
business in corporate groups, operating cross-border and – for financial 
institutions – cross-sector (‘bankassurance’).48 Certainly, there is a ‘hermeneutic 
                                                 
46 Including specificity, see e.g. recital 16 Directive 2001/24, which provides a foundation for the rule 
of international jurisdiction that Art. 9(1) Directive 2001/24 introduces with regard to the opening of 
winding-up proceedings: ‘Equal treatment of creditors requires that the credit institution is wound 
up according to the principles of unity and universality, which require the administrative or judicial 
authorities of the home Member State to have sole jurisdiction and their decisions to be recognized 
and to be capable of producing in all the other Member States, without any formality …’ 
47 Leaving aside suggestions for general improvements, see Wessels, The European Insolvency 
Regulation: Three Years Later, in: European Company Law 2005/02.  
48 In the opinion of the European Monetary Institute (EMI), published O.J. C 332/13 of 30 October 





circle’ in the context of general rule – special rules (Regulation – Directives). In 
this respect the Directives should be interpreted in alignment with the EU 
Insolvency Regulation (e.g. type of proceedings; conflict of law rules). In 
addition one will have to swing around that circle in that with regard to financial 
institutions specific community principles (free establishment), particular 
financial sector principles (‘single entity’; ‘unity’) and norms (‘lex domus’) 
come into play, and these will apply in a wider pitch, including the EEA 
countries and affecting branches of non EU banks.  
 
 
                                                                                                                   
financial entities and on reorganization and winding up of a branch of one undertaking on other 
entities within the same corporate group. 
